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Tocqueville’s view of the relationship of doubt to democracy is an important and 
underexplored aspect of Democracy in America. Illuminating it not only deepens our 
grasp of his thought, but also adds to broader theoretical debates about political 
psychology.  I deepen our understanding of this theme by elaborating why exactly the 
democratic social state produces in people the sort of skeptical doubt characteristic of the 
Cartesian approach to philosophy. I also enumerate what factors in the democratic social 
state and in human nature set a boundary on the extent to which the exertions of the 
individual intellect can achieve knowledge. Additionally I draw together different 
sections of Democracy in America to show how democratic people’s tendency toward 
this kind of thinking poses serious risks for self-government if left unmediated.  Religion, 
which Tocqueville holds out as the key to restraining that doubt, has seen its authority 
wane in the time since he wrote. Nonetheless, I argue that other remarks Tocqueville 
makes in Democracy in America suggest that a robust conception of individual rights can 
provide a new source of intellectual authority for political and moral debate that is 
resistant to doubt’s corrosive power. 
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The sort of knowledge that provides the firmest foundation for an enduring political 
order has been a topic of enduring debate in the history of political thought. Some argue 
that politics functions best through deference to the putative wisdom contained in custom, 
tradition, and faith. Others counter that reliance on rational first principles arrived at 
without deference to any authority is best. René Descartes is an important originator of the 
latter approach. Although Descartes never composed a systematic treatment of political 
themes, his epistemology of rational first principles arrived at through doubting everything 
leads quite naturally to a politics of rational first principles arrived at through questioning 
all received sources of authority. 1  This can be discerned when, at the beginning of his 
statement of philosophic method, he observes that “there is less perfection in works 
composed of several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those 
on which one [master] has worked.” Descartes’ inclusion among illustration of this 
principle of the single prudent legislator who gives laws to a people makes it clear that he 
is aware of the fact that the principle has political implications.2   
Descartes’ advocacy of rules of reason arrived at through the application of 
relentless skepticism to the beliefs handed down by custom, tradition, and faith would come 
                                                 
1 Descartes is often understood as counseling political conformity, given that the first rule of the moral 
code he sets for himself “for the time being” required him to “obey the laws and customs of my country, 
adhering constantly to the religion to the religion in which by God’s grace I had been instructed since 
childhood.” Nevertheless, in addition to the provisional nature of this rule, it must also be noted that later in 
the same paragraph he states that “in the corrupt state of our manners there are few people who desire to 
say all that they believe.”  Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. David 
Weissman. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 15-16. For more on Descartes as a political thinker, 
see Richard Kennington, "Rene Descartes," in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph 
Cropsey, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
2 Descartes 8-9.  
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to be the norm in the political sphere with the spread of the Enlightenment. Some thinkers, 
though, have questioned the extent to which an intellectual framework built upon thorough-
going doubt of received opinions can produce healthy politics, and democratic politics 
specifically. I contend that insight into the relationship between doubt and democratic 
politics can be found by examining the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville 
famously opens Volume II of Democracy in America with the observation that Americans 
are Cartesian without having ever read Descartes because they live in accordance with the 
principle that one ought to “seek on one’s own and in oneself alone the reason for things.”3 
Elaborating his broader understanding of the relationship of doubt to democracy, however, 
requires careful attention to varied and sometimes seemingly disparate sections of his work. 
Such an inquiry brings to light Tocqueville’s two distinctive contributions to this issue. 
First, Tocqueville argues that doubt in modern democracy derives not just from the 
doctrines of philosophers like Descartes, but also arises from the nature of democracy itself. 
Second, he shows how doubt in democracy generates both positive and negative 
phenomena—and the latter can be harnessed to mediate the former.  
Specifically, consideration of key sections in Democracy in America demonstrates 
Tocqueville’s view that, left unmediated, democratic peoples’ rejection of all sources of 
knowledge other than the individual intellect eventually inculcates among citizens a 
pervasive doubt about the possibility of any certain knowledge concerning matters of the 
highest importance. He argues that most individuals lack the ability to transcend such 
                                                 
3Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, NY: The Library 
of America, 2004), 483. 
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doubt.4 Furthermore, his comments on this theme reveal that widespread doubt poses three 
potential risks for the well-being of society. First, it stimulates people to think solely in 
terms of their material interest, rather than higher individual ends or the well-being of the 
entire community. Second, it undermines the possibility of meaningful public debate by 
eroding personal conviction. Third, it weakens people’s belief in their own agency—a 
notion without which self-government cannot function.  
These difficulties may seem practically irresolvable given that the doubt that 
engenders them is itself a consequence of the democratic equality of conditions. However, 
examination of other passages of Democracy in America nonetheless indicates that a means 
to ameliorating the negative effects of doubt lies in harnessing other tendencies latent 
within democracy. Notably, doubt itself plays a key role in the emergence of several of 
these tendencies, which shows that Tocqueville recognizes the salutary as well as the 
destructive potential of doubt. Specifically, Tocqueville suggests that the notion of 
individual rights can provide some basis for moral and political conviction in an 
environment otherwise stripped of authoritative beliefs. The notion of rights also provides 
a check on the untrammeled pursuit of self-interest. Tocqueville identifies certain aspects 
of democracy that help render the idea of rights less susceptible than old ideals to the 
corrosive power of doubt. These include the poetic imagination democracy gives rise to, 
                                                 
4 Tocqueville’s correspondence reveals his personal experience with this theme. In a letter written near the 
end of his life, he describes delving into his father’s library of French philosophes and ancient authors as a 
teen, an inquiry that he reports left him seized by an “all-embracing doubt.” He analogizes the experience 
to living through an earthquake. Although he notes that “strong passions” turned him away from this 
despair, he nonetheless acknowledges that these feelings he experienced in his youth periodically take hold 
of him again (André Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography, trans. Lydia Davis with Robert Hemenway (New 
York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1998), 61-64).  
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the compassion democracy engenders, and the tendency toward general ideas that it 
promotes.  Furthermore, citizens’ participation in associations offers a corrective to certain 
limitations of the faith in individual rights. Associations also provide a bulwark against the 
loss of faith in individual agency that emerges in democratic times. 
 To recapitulate, Tocqueville’s reflections on doubt in democracy provide a worthy 
object of investigation for three reasons. First, he advances an account of doubt and 
democracy in which each phenomenon, rather than being wholly distinct, are deeply 
intertwined. Second, he demonstrates how, despite this interrelation, doubt holds the 
potential to generate consequences that threaten democracy’s foundations. Third, he shows 
that other aspects of democracy as he understands it, including among them some positive 
outgrowths of doubt, offer means of countering doubt’s centrifugal effects. 
 Although Tocqueville’s work has generated a wealth of scholarship, relatively little 
of it focuses on his understanding of doubt, or the relationship between doubt and 
democracy.5 Some scholarship that has broached this topic include articles by L. Joseph 
Hebert,6 and Laurence D. Cooper,7 as well as Peter Lawler’s book The Restless Mind.8 This 
essay builds on these authors’ work to illuminate an under-examined aspect of 
Tocqueville’s thought. Although not explicitly focused on doubt, Hebert’s attempt to 
                                                 
5 Also of note is the fact that the two most recent translations of Democracy in America contain no index 
entries for the word “doubt.”  
6 L. Joseph Hebert, Jr., "Individualism and Intellectual Liberty in Tocqueville and Descartes," The Journal 
of Politics 69, no. 2 (May 2007). 
7 Laurence D. Cooper, "Every Man a Socrates? Tocqueville and the Conceit of Modernity," American 
Political Thought 1, no. 2 (Fall 2012). 
8 Peter Augustine Lawler, The Restless Mind: Alexis de Tocqueville on the Origin and Perpetuation of 
Human Liberty (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1993). 
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define what Tocqueville understands to be the intellectual habits of Americans lays 
important groundwork for this present study. His observation that “rational individualism” 
paradoxically leads to intellectual conformism and the diminishment of meaningful 
intellectual liberty is an important insight into how Tocqueville understands the connection 
between the social and intellectual world.9 Nonetheless, he leaves the wider political 
consequences of Americans’ insistence on “seek[ing] on one’s own and in oneself alone 
the reason for things” largely unexplored. He also devotes little attention to exploring the 
ways in which, for Tocqueville, distinguishing features of the democratic social state 
generate and reinforce intellectual doubt. I attempt to unpack these themes in the present 
inquiry, with the objective of showing why, for Tocqueville, doubt and democracy are 
inextricably intertwined.  
 While Hebert focuses primarily on the intellectual habits of Americans as described 
by Tocqueville, Cooper recognizes that Tocqueville thinks Americans’ tendency toward 
“Cartesianism” in intellectual matters is influenced by their social state. However, Cooper 
proceeds to downplay the role of social conditions in producing this mindset.” He poses 
the question of whether Americans are Cartesian because of Descartes, or whether they 
have become so for reasons arising from the democratic social state.  He states that 
Tocqueville at first seems to indicate the latter, but then later “suggests that Descartes and 
other philosophers were in fact behind this revolution in consciousness.”10  It is true that 
Tocqueville appears to advance both these accounts. Rushing to declare intellectual forces 
                                                 
9 Hebert 525. 
10 Cooper 218. 
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as determinative of social ones in Tocqueville’s analysis, though, obscures the extent to 
which he reveals the reciprocal influence of each upon the other. Indeed, his work 
illuminates the complexities of socio-political life, and draws attention to instances in 
which one can observe “cause and effect engender[ing] one another in an endless circle.”11 
 Lawler’s attempt in The Restless Mind to illuminate the understating of the human 
condition that is at the foundation of Tocqueville’s concept of liberty contains an extended 
discussion of Tocqueville’s relationship to Pascal. This theme is crucial for grasping 
Tocqueville’s understanding of the limits of human knowledge. I build on Lawler’s 
analysis by connecting the treatment of Pascal to Tocqueville’s remarks about doubt and 
politics.   










                                                 
11 Tocqueville 597. 
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II. The Origins of Doubt in Democracy 
Tocqueville’s brief but richly suggestive remarks about certainty and the progress 
of the human intellect in a passage of Volume I of Democracy in America provide a fitting 
place to begin this inquiry into the sources and effects of doubt in democracy, because this 
section sheds light on his understanding of the relation between doubt and the democratic 
social state. Near the conclusion of a discussion of press freedom, Tocqueville refashions 
a maxim of Pascal’s, asserting that “deep convictions are found only at the two ends [of 
knowledge], and…in the middle lies doubt.” He then proceeds to enumerate “three distinct 
and often successive states of human intelligence.” The “deep conviction” of the first state 
of human intelligence is thoroughly unreflective, and can fall prey to doubt when faced 
with objections. Indeed, doubt itself constitutes the second state. In the third and final state, 
a person lays his or her doubts to rest and believes once more. Such an individual “no 
longer clings to a truth plucked at random from the darkness but stares truth in the face and 
marches directly toward its light.”12   
While this initial formulation situates the states of intelligence within the minds of 
individuals, Tocqueville proceeds to map two of these three states onto societies. He 
indicates that when a free press, and by implication the general free exchange of ideas, 
encounters people in the state of unreflective conviction, it does not immediately overturn 
their tendency to believe uncritically, but instead “changes the object of their uncritical 
belief from one day to the next.” Over time, “nearly the whole range of new ideas is 
                                                 
12 Tocqueville 213. 
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explored,” and “doubt and universal mistrust” seep in. Tocqueville quickly dashes any 
hope that an entire people can ascend beyond here. He declares bluntly that most 
individuals will remain in either credulous conviction or pervasive doubt, while only a few 
will attain “the reflective, self-assured conviction that grows out of knowledge and emerges 
from the agitation of doubt itself.”13 Furthermore, and most worryingly, Tocqueville asserts 
that, in centuries of doubt, since social theories are contested one after another, “anyone 
who once adheres to one of them holds on to it not so much because he is sure that it is 
good as because he is not sure that anything else is better.”  This rendition suggests that, 
possessing no decisive reason for holding fast to their own views, and doubting that the 
truth can be known at all, modern democratic individuals are all the less susceptible to the 
reasons offered for contrary views.14 Tocqueville also posits that, when opinions are 
endlessly contested, people turn to instinct and material interest as guides instead, “because 
these are far plainer to see, easier to grasp, and by nature more permanent than opinions.”15 
In other words, by attenuating the convictions of democratic people, doubt makes them 
both less receptive to persuasion and more inclined to act on the basis of interest and 
instinct rather than higher ideals. 
With this summary statement about the effects of doubt on individuals and society 
laid out, it is necessary now to step back and examine in greater detail what Tocqueville 
has to say about the origins and consequences of the popularization of doubt. A good place 
                                                 
13 Tocqueville 214. 
14 Hebert 528. 
15 Tocqueville 214. 
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to begin this task is with a more in-depth investigation of Tocqueville’s remarks about the 
philosophic method of the Americans in the opening chapter of Volume II of Democracy 
in America. This section expands on the previously discussed one by further illuminating 
what Tocqueville understands to be the intellectual state of people in democracy. Here he 
declares that, in most activities of the mind, Americans rely principally on the unaided 
effort of their own individual reason—as previously indicated, they seek on their own and 
in themselves alone “the reason for things.”16 He connects this “philosophical method of 
Americans” with intellectual currents in Europe by noting that “America is one of the 
countries in which Descartes is studied least but his precepts are respected most.” Indeed, 
Americans respect Descartes’ maxims despite never having read them because their social 
state “leaves them perfectly disposed to adopt them.”17  Thus, people in democracy rely on 
individual reason as the primary source of knowledge not through conscious choice but 
rather because their way of life makes it seem like the only valid path to understanding. 
What exactly this means requires some elaboration. 
By way of explaining the claim that Americans’ social state inclines them to accept 
Descartes’ maxims, Tocqueville states that the philosophic impulse to submit an ever-
expanding range of beliefs to the scrutiny of each individual could not have been widely 
adopted until equality became the dominant principle in political laws and social life.18 
Indeed, democracy’s elimination of “any incontestable mark of greatness or superiority” 
                                                 
16 Tocqueville 483. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Tocqueville 485.  
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forces individuals to rely on their own reason rather than another’s intelligence because 
one’s individual reason presents “the most obvious and accessible source of truth” now 
that traditional sources of authority have been dethroned. Additionally, in Tocqueville’s 
telling, the democratic principle of equality “destroys not just confidence in particular 
individuals, but also the readiness to believe anyone solely on the basis of his word.”19 It 
should come as no surprise, then, that Americans, Tocqueville’s leading example of a 
people in the democratic social state, “are always looking for the weak side of any doctrine 
deemed authoritative.”20 In fact, Americans’ resourcefulness reinforces this mental habit. 
Tocqueville observes that Americans see they can overcome “all the petty difficulties of 
practical life on their own,” which leads them to “readily conclude that everything in the 
world can be explained and that nothing surpasses the limits of intelligence.”21 Thus, socio-
political norms and material facts combine to suggest to people in democracy that the 
exercise of the individual intellect provides the only reliable path to knowledge.  
Though Americans may possess great confidence in the capability of their 
intellects, Tocqueville nonetheless argues that there are clear limits to this “popular 
Cartesianism” that democracy engenders. Intriguingly, many of these limits arise from 
democracy itself. For example, Tocqueville argues in a chapter on the status of science in 
America that democratic peoples have a tendency to focus themselves on practical 
applications of reason while almost completely ignoring “the essentially theoretical and 
                                                 
19 Tocqueville 484.  
20 Tocqueville 522.  
21 Tocqueville 484.  
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abstract aspects of human knowledge.”22 In his telling, multiple causes account for this. 
Primary among them is the fact that meditation is necessary for the cultivation of higher 
sciences, but nothing is less suited to mediation than “the circumstances of democratic 
society.” This is because in such a society everyone restlessly searches after wealth or 
power, which leaves little time for calm repose.23 Tocqueville earlier acknowledges that 
this very restlessness can impel people in a democratic social state to pursue “the labors of 
the mind.” He indicates, however, that they will pursue such endeavors not for their 
perceived intrinsic merit but rather as means to the aforementioned ends of wealth and 
power, as well as fame.24  
Tocqueville clarifies this point by distinguishing between a desire to use knowledge 
and a “pure desire to know.” In his view, it is this latter drive, the “ardent, proud, 
disinterested love of what is true” which impels humans to the “abstract sources of truth” 
from which fundamental ideas are drawn.25 While aristocracy’s fixed inequality of 
conditions pushes individuals to seek these “abstract sources of truth,” the democratic 
social state’s fluidity encourages them to pursue only science’s immediate and useful 
applications.26 The widespread drive toward worldly gain, then, turns people’s attention 
away from higher realms of thought.  
In addition to giving greater emphasis to lower levels of intellectual achievement 
than higher ones, the democratic social state fosters habits of thinking contrary to those 
                                                 
22 Tocqueville 523.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Tocqueville 521. 
25 Tocqueville 525. 
26 Tocqueville 527. 
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requisite for great mental endeavors. This is evident in Tocqueville’s declaration that 
“when everyone is active, there is a general tendency to place too much value on quickness 
of mind and superficial concepts, and too little on deeper but slower exertions of the 
intellect.”27 Furthermore, according to Tocqueville, one of the distinctive characteristics of 
democratic centuries is a taste for easy successes and instant gratification—a quality that 
he makes a point of noting can be found in peoples’ intellectual pursuits.28 Somewhat 
paradoxically, democratic man’s curiosity is both insatiable and easily satisfied; he is intent 
on knowing a lot quickly rather than a few things well. As Tocqueville puts it, “habitual 
inattention is a major defect of the democratic mind.”29 His observation that “the 
recklessness and turnover of people [in democracy] disturbs and distracts the mind without 
stimulating or elevating it” reinforces the notion that the democratic social state saps the 
human intellect of its capacity to focus.30  Thus, both the fluidity of the social world, as 
well as the widespread propensity to prefer quick rewards in mental endeavors, impedes 
peoples’ ascent to the “abstract sources of truth.” 
While many of the limitations on the power of the individual intellect to yield 
knowledge are attributable to the time-bound phenomenon of democracy, others 
limitations that Tocqueville identifies derive from certain fixed aspects of human nature. 
In particular, he argues that how easy or hard it is for people to live without working sets 
an inevitable limit to their intellectual progress, given that such progress requires 
                                                 
27 Tocqueville 524. 
28 Tocqueville 498. 
29 Tocqueville 718 
30 Tocqueville 524. 
 13 
substantial time and effort. As he puts it, “it is as difficult to conceive of a society in which 
everyone is highly enlightened as of a state in which every citizen is wealthy; the two 
difficulties are related.”31 Tocqueville reinforces the importance of sustained leisure for the 
heights of intellectual attainment when he asserts that “only minds truly emancipated from 
everyday preoccupations…can break through to necessary truths, and then only with a 
great investment of time and care.”32 In most epochs, the majority of people attain 
emancipation from “everyday preoccupations” rarely, if at all. This would seem to be 
especially the case in democracy, given Tocqueville’s suggestion that, in this type of 
regime, people’s minds are universally preoccupied with bodily needs and comforts.33  
Significantly, the examples of “necessary truths” that Tocqueville argues ordinary 
people lack the capability to reach include conceptions of God, his relations with humanity, 
the nature of the soul, and “man’s duties to his fellow man.” People possess an immense 
interest in developing clear notions about these themes, he argues, because doubt about 
them would leave all human conduct vulnerable to chance and condemn people to “disorder 
and impotence.”34 It is for this reason that Tocqueville argues that “general ideas pertaining 
to God and human nature” are most appropriately shielded from the action of individual 
reason.”35 This passage clearly indicates that the chief defect of democratic peoples’ 
reliance on individual reason as a means to knowledge is that most people are unable to 
                                                 
31 Tocqueville 226.  
32 Tocqueville 501. 
33 Tocqueville 617. 
34 Tocqueville 501. 
35 Tocqueville 502.  
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reach the firm convictions about metaphysical and moral matters that they need to live 
lives. 
Thus, to borrow Hebert’s formulation, Tocqueville’s critique of treating the 
individual intellect as the primary source of knowledge “rests in part on his view of how 
difficult it is to philosophize well.36 Specifically, it falsely presupposes that each of us is 
capable of deciding for himself all that interests us, and even that an individual can “prove 
to himself all the truths of which he daily avails himself.”37 An accomplishment of this 
degree lies beyond the reach of even the greatest philosophers, who must “adopt many 
beliefs without discussing them so as to delve more deeply into the small number [they 
have] singled out for scrutiny.”38 Strikingly, in Tocqueville’s assessment, even 
philosophers such as these, who have broken through to “necessary truths,” are still “almost 
always plagued by uncertainties.”39  
Hebert seizes on the “almost” in this quotation, and argues that for Tocqueville, 
significant knowledge is possible. One of the passages he cites in support of this is 
Tocqueville’s statement that “in the midst of the apparent diversity of human things, it is 
not impossible to find a small number of basic facts from which all others derive.”40 
Tocqueville makes this comment, though, in light of the similarity he observes between 
the political institutions of the Native Americans and those of the early Europeans as 
described by Tacitus. Thus, the “significant knowledge” hinted at here is knowledge about 
                                                 
36 Hebert 527. 
37 Tocqueville 489. 
38 Tocqueville 490.  
39 Tocqueville 501. 
40 Tocqueville 379. 
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the general principles underlying the development of human society. While such insight 
surely possesses great value, it nonetheless falls short of the sort of knowledge about 
metaphysical matters that Tocqueville seems to think are of the highest importance for 
human beings. Indeed, Hebert’s claim about Tocqueville’s belief in humans’ ability to 
acquire significant knowledge is further belied elsewhere.  
Furthermore, in the passage immediately following the one about philosophers 
being “almost always plagued with uncertainties” that Hebert cites, Tocqueville charges 
that such thinkers have so far been able to discover “only a small number of contradictory 
notions.”41 This passage prompts us to wonder to what extent Tocqueville thinks humans 
can grasp enduring, abstract truths at all, and what significance the limitations of the 
powers of our reason have for politics. In order to begin to answer this question, it is 









                                                 
41 Tocqueville 501, emphasis mine.  
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III. Tocqueville and Pascal on Politics and the Limits of Human Reason 
Some clarity on Tocqueville’s view about the limits of the human mind, and the 
political consequences of those limits, can be gained by considering in greater detail his 
allusion to Pascal that was discussed at the beginning of section II of this paper. As several 
scholars have noted, Pascal’s writings had a major influence on Tocqueville’s thought.42 
In the fragment to which Tocqueville alludes here, Pascal holds that the development of 
the thought of the human individual is a circle, the end of which is a sort of return to the 
original condition of ignorance. But this end is not identical to the “natural ignorance” in 
which “all men find themselves at birth.” Rather, it is a “learned ignorance that is conscious 
of itself.”43 While Tocqueville holds that doubt characterizes the middle state of human 
intellectual development, Pascal posits that vain pretension to knowledge lies between the 
“natural” and “learned” ignorance that he sees as existing at successive extremes. As 
Lawler puts it, for Pascal, the mind’s development is error or vanity becoming conscious 
of itself.44  
This “learned ignorance” that Pascal attributes to the farthest extreme of human 
knowledge does not appear incompatible with the “deep conviction” that Tocqueville says 
lies at the same extreme. After all, one could possess a deep, reflection-wrought conviction 
                                                 
42 See Luis Diez del Corral, El pensamiento político de Tocqueville : Formación intelectual y ambiente 
histórico (Madrid : Alianza Editorial, 1989) ; André Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography, trans. Lydia Davis 
with Robert Hemenway (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1998); and Lawler 1993, cited in full at 
note 7.   
43 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. W. Trotter (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1958), fr 327. Subsequent references 
to this source will be to fragment numbers as given in this edition, which follows the Brunschvicg 
numbering.    
44 Lawler 75.   
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concerning one’s own ignorance. Here it is also relevant to recall Tocqueville’s contention 
that “it is not only necessary but desirable” that even philosophers believe some things on 
faith.45 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that both Tocqueville and Pascal think that 
reason by itself cannot resolve all of the most profound questions that concern human 
beings.   
In light of his assessment of the limitations of the human intellect, Tocqueville 
advances a moderate critique of unmediated rationalism on account of its centrifugal 
effects on the political and social world.  As indicated previously, he urges that “general 
ideas pertaining to God and human nature” be shielded from the skeptical questioning of 
individual reason.46 As he puts it, “there must always be a place in the intellectual and 
moral world where authority exists…individual independence may be great or small, but 
it cannot be boundless.”47 However, he does not want to eliminate applications of skeptical 
rationalism in politics, but only to circumscribe them.  
Pascal, by contrast, draws a different conclusion from his assessment of the 
limitations of the human intellect. He rejects rationalism in politics completely, holding 
that the attempt to return to “natural and fundamental laws of the state” is “a game certain 
to result in the loss of all.”48 As he sees it, the reason for this lies in humans’ self-love. 
Civil war, which he calls the greatest evil, will surely result if we try to establish a rational 
state that rewards merit, because all will insist that they are deserving.49  Indeed, self-love 
                                                 
45 Tocqueville 490. 
46 Tocqueville 502.  
47 Ibid.   
48 Fr. 284.  
49 Fr. 313 
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makes humans hate the truth of their imperfection.50 In his critique of rationalism in 
politics, Pascal even goes so far as to assert that “the caprice of men has so many vagaries 
that there is no such [natural] law” common to all humanity.51  
A few paragraphs later, he revises this formulation slightly, conceding that there 
are no doubt natural laws, but insists that “good reason once corrupted”—that is, corrupted 
by original sin—“has corrupted all.” Indeed, in his view, reason cannot discover what “is 
just in itself.” Given the fact of reason’s weakness, he suggests that the surest thing to do 
is to affirm established custom, which he argues “creates the whole of equity.”52 Pascal 
does believe that we can grasp some measure of justice, to the extent that God wills to 
reveal it to us.53 What he doubts is that man can realize a just political order on the basis 
of this knowledge, given the difficulty of making might obey right.54 Reason may reveal 
to us the good we ought to pursue and the evil we ought to avoid, but, as Pascal puts it, “it 
is power that makes opinion.”55 Submission to the authority of convention is Pascal’s 
solution to the inability of reason to ascertain rules of justice that command universal 
assent.56 Given all this, it should come as no surprise that Pascal holds a relatively low 
view of political life, referring to it at one point as a “lunatic asylum” dominated by 
“madmen.”57 
                                                 
50 Fr. 100 
51 Fr. 294 
52 Fr. 294; see also fr. 309 and fr. 312.  
53 Fr. 375.  
54 Fr. 298, 299.  
55 Fr. 303.  
56  Virgil Martin Nemoianu, "Pascal on Skepticism and Order" (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2002), 
142. 
57 Fr. 331.  
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Though Tocqueville adopts much of Pascal’s criticism of rationalism, he rejects his 
solution. Like Pascal, Tocqueville seems to believe that there is a conception of justice by 
which human order could be judged and found deficient.58 But, unlike Pascal, this does not 
lead him to reject politics completely. Similar to Pascal, Tocqueville evinces little faith in 
utopian schemes that seek to replace “complex traditional customs” with “simple, 
elementary rules…deduced from reason and natural law.”59 But he does not follow Pascal 
in calling for a suspension of one’s doubt and skeptical questioning of those customs. He 
refers to the “injustices” of aristocratic societies, which makes it clear that he sees 
something positive in doubt’s undoing of hierarchies sanctioned by tradition.60  It is not 
just that he thinks Pascal’s approach is morally deficient, though.  Rather, Tocqueville 
likely regards Pascal’s submission to established convention as ultimately futile, given that 
“the gradual development of equality of conditions” that characterizes democracy is a 
“providential fact,”61 and this equality, in his view, cannot fail to destroy what is purely 
conventional in thought.62 As indicated previously, for Tocqueville the social and the 
intellectual are mutually reinforcing. The progress of equality in the socio-political sphere 
makes it virtually impossible to completely expel doubt and skeptical questioning.  
Yet, Tocqueville elsewhere asserts that it is both necessary and desirable for some 
authority to exist in the intellectual world.63 In light of most people’s inability to use their 
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own individual reason to attain strong beliefs about God, the soul, and human beings’ 
duties to each other, Tocqueville argues that authoritative beliefs pertaining to religion are 
most desirable of all. Indeed, religions that provide clear notions about God and human 
nature, and do not seek to inhibit the growth of the mind in other realms, impose what he 
terms a “salutary discipline on the intellect.”64 In his view, a large part of the advantage of 
this discipline is that it enables self-government. Indeed, he expresses doubt about whether 
humans can ever tolerate both complete religious independence and total political liberty.65 
For Tocqueville, then, submission to authority must play some role in human life precisely 
so that it does not play every role.66 His objective is to qualify and criticize the general 
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IV. Doubt and Religion 
Although Tocqueville is full of praise for the religion of Americans in Democracy 
in America, it is worth exploring at some length what he thinks would be the consequences 
of doubt eroding religious faith. After all, his insistence on the need for received authority 
in the intellectual realm seems somewhat at odds with his statement that the development 
of equality of conditions tends to undermine what is conventional in the realm of thought. 
Given that religion undoubtedly imposes far less of a “salutary discipline on the intellect” 
in the United States today than when Tocqueville visited, this line of inquiry is more than 
just idle speculation. Rather, it provides some insight into how Tocqueville would account 
for our present situation. 
In Volume 1 of Democracy in America, Tocqueville boldly asserts that “unbelief is 
an accident; faith alone is the permanent condition of humankind.”67 A few pages later, 
though, he qualifies this statement by labelling schism and indifference as “two great 
dangers [that] threaten the existence of religion.”68 Indifference, he indicates, arises when 
“negative doctrines” assert the falsity of one religion without arguing for the truth of any 
other. Although he doesn’t explicitly say so, these “negative doctrines” sound like the sort 
of ideas that might emerge into a culture’s intellectual landscape when doubt is unbounded 
and all received sources of authority are submitted to the scrutiny of the individual intellect. 
As has already been shown, this is precisely the direction towards which democracy tends. 
The notion of doubt as a force that pulls individuals toward ruin is vividly present in 
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Tocqueville’s evocative description of religious indifference taking hold. He declares that 
“swept along by an imperceptible current which they lack the courage to fight yet to which 
they surrender with regret, they abandon the faith they love in order to follow doubt that 
leads to despair.”69  
Later, in Volume Two, Tocqueville expands on this idea, declaring that when a 
people’s religion is destroyed, “doubt takes hold of the highest regions of the intellect and 
half paralyzes all the others…such a state inevitably enervates the soul; it weakens the 
springs of the will and prepares citizens for servitude.”70 The connection between doubt’s 
erosion of religion on one hand, and the decline in the possibility of meaningful political 
deliberation on the other, is apparent in Tocqueville’s declaration that individuals who have 
lost their religion “defend their opinions badly or give them up all together.”71 This passage 
suggests that when skepticism undermines religious faith, that doubt diffuses into the realm 
of moral and political standards more generally. This statement also provides additional 
insight into how exactly doubt that saps faith in God might incline people toward servitude. 
By weakening people’s convictions, such doubt discourages individuals from considering 
themselves capable of and in need of persuading and being persuaded. This shift limits the 
possibility of robust public debate, and therefore poses a threat to the realization of self-
government. Paradoxically, the unrestrained doubt that causes this danger to self-
government is in Tocqueville’s telling latent within democracy itself.    
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Though the growth of doubt may weaken religion and undermine the possibility of 
public debate that democracy requires, Tocqueville nonetheless suggests that doubt will 
not do away with all authority in the intellectual realm. As noted previously, he 
categorically asserts that there must be a place where authority exists in this domain.”72 
One might wonder how this proposition can possibly be true if the democratic trend toward 
greater reliance on individual reason as a guide to truth undermines intellectual and moral 
sources of authority. In Tocqueville’s understanding, however, it is precisely this reliance 
on individual reason that establishes the power of the majority over thought. In yet another 
paradox, unbounded intellectual freedom can lead to herd-like conformity. According to 
Tocqueville, in democracy, “men have no faith in one another because of their similarity, 
but that same similarity gives them almost unlimited confidence in the judgment of the 
public.”73 Indeed, “not only is common opinion the only guide left to individual reason in 
democratic nations, but its power is there is infinitely greater than it is elsewhere.”74 He 
makes this claim more vivid by positing that, in times of equality, “faith in common opinion 
will become a sort of religion, with the majority as its prophet.”75 Such phrasing suggests 
that this ersatz religion of majority opinion may take the place of genuine religions when 
doubt enervates those belief systems. Crucially, though, this “faith” would not carry with 
it the benefits that Tocqueville attributes to genuine religion because it would not provide 
answers to “primordial questions” about God and human nature.  
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The consequences of the substitution of the religion of common opinion for genuine 
religion, though, becomes clear when we consider why exactly genuine religion imposes a 
salutary check on democracy. A particularly relevant reason to consider here is the fact that 
religion, by establishing the sovereignty of God, places a limit on the otherwise 
untrammeled sovereignty of the people. Paradoxically, Tocqueville regards this constraint 
on popular sovereignty as crucial for self-government. He reaches this conclusion from the 
observation that people “become frightened in the face of unlimited independence.” To 
assuage this fear, they surrender their liberty and subject themselves to a master.76 Thus, 
complete freedom is unbearable, and leads naturally to despotism. Religion assuages this 
anxiety, and, by circumscribing freedom, makes free government possible. As noted 
previously, Tocqueville wants authority to reign in some spheres of human life so that it 
does not rule over every domain. 
Tocqueville also indicates that religion provides an important moral restraint on 
democracy. This is evident in his statement that the strong presence of religion in America 
is the reason why no one there has seen fit to advance the claim that “everything is 
permitted in the interest of society.” 77 In this remark, we can clearly discern the connection 
that Tocqueville draws between the absence of religion and social corruption. When the 
corrosive power of doubt loosens the moral inhibitions that religion imposes, it risks 
generating a situation in which no norm remains to check the majority’s pursuit of what it 
regards as its own good.  
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In summary, the democratic social state produces a popularization of the 
Enlightenment philosophers’ unwillingness to defer to received opinions, in which all 
citizens rely own their own individual reason. But the limitations of the power of individual 
reason, both natural and historically contingent, prevent people from attaining firm 
consensus about the sorts of moral and metaphysical issues that they need to live their lives. 
Given this limitation of skeptical rationalism, Tocqueville asserts that dogmatic beliefs are 
necessary and desirable, and dogmatic beliefs in matters of religion are most desirable of 
all. He argues that this restraint on intellectual freedom makes political freedom possible.  
Tocqueville makes clear, though, that when indifference causes religion’s hold on 
people to loosen, then doubt seizes the higher realms of their mind, and saps the strength 
of their convictions. Furthermore, doubt about religious claims engenders a broad 
skepticism about moral principles in general. This imperils the sort of public debate crucial 
to self-government, and leaves little to restrain the pursuit of interest. Additionally, once 
the answers that religion provides to fundamental existential questions are thrown into 
doubt, and tumult reigns in the intellectual sphere, people become “anxious and fatigued.” 
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V. Mediating Doubt and Renewing the Possibility of Politics 
At first glance, it is not immediately apparent what forms of moral and intellectual 
authority could possibly provide the same sort of salutary restraint that religion does. After 
all, these restraints seem to be largely matters of convention, and democracy undermines 
existing social conventions while “preventing men from settling easily on new ones.”79 
Further reflection, though, reveals that the means of checking this excess of democracy lies 
at least in part in harnessing a particular idea that democracy itself engenders. Indeed, 
Tocqueville states that equality suggests a number of ideas that would not otherwise occur 
to the human mind.80 One such idea that democracy suggests is universal rights. Indeed, 
that democracy puts the idea of rights within everyone’s reach is in Tocqueville’s 
assessment one of democracy’s greatest merits.81 In a stirring passage that is worth quoting 
at length, he provides insight into the importance of rights: 
Is it not obvious to you that belief is everywhere giving way to reasoning and 
sentiment to calculation? If, in the midst of this universal upheaval, you do not 
succeed in linking the idea of rights to the personal interest that stands out as the 
only fixed point in the human heart, what means of governing the world will be left 
to you other than fear?82 
Based on this declaration, it seems that rights could provide some normative foundation to 
replace the traditional sources of value that democratic doubt eroded, thereby providing a 
basis for debate, persuasion, and action. Before becoming too enamored with this solution, 
though, we ought to ask what exactly about the “idea of rights” will lead doubt-wracked 
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individuals in a democratic social state to hold to it persistently rather than discarding it 
along with so many other debunked doctrines. Formulating an answer to this question 
requires that we look to the style of poetry democracy gives rise to, the compassion 
democracy engenders, and the tendency toward general ideas that it promotes. Doubt plays 
a role in unleashing all three of these phenomena, which shows that Tocqueville recognizes 
the positive as well as negative consequences of doubt’s spread, and that his discussion of 
this points the way toward how its salutary effects can be harnessed to moderate the 
negative ones.   
 A fitting place to begin this discussion is with Tocqueville’s discussion of the 
sources of poetry in different societies. He defines poetry as “the search for and depiction 
of the ideal” and states that the aim of poetry is “not to represent what is true, but to 
embellish it.”83 It might seem odd to claim that an aesthetic enterprise like poetry could 
explain the solidity of a moral-political concept like universal rights. The poetry of 
democracy, though, highlights the tendencies of the idealizing imagination in the 
democratic soul more generally, and therefore provides insights into its normative 
dimensionality.84 Doubt’s central role here is apparent in Tocqueville’s contention that, in 
democratic centuries, doubt pulls the poet’s imagination back down to earth and confines 
him to the visible and real world.”85 Indeed, equality “does not destroy the imagination, 
but it does limit it, forcing it to hew close to the earth as it flies.”86 With these words, 
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Tocqueville indicates that the objects of the idealizing imagination of democratic people 
cease to be gods or heroes, as was the case in aristocratic societies, and become things more 
within the realm of day-to-day experience. Impelled by this reorientation of imagination, 
poets will first turn to “inanimate nature,” although he notes that this is only a “passing 
phase.” In the long run, he declares, democracy will “deflect the imagination from 
everything external to man in order to focus it exclusively on man himself.”87  
Democratic poetry thus concerns itself not with supernatural beings or exemplary 
individuals, but rather humans considered in the abstract. As Tocqueville puts it, “man 
taken apart from time and country and set before nature and God” will be the main, if not 
the only focus of poetry.88 Strikingly, Tocqueville goes so far as to argue that nothing lends 
itself more to portrayal of the ideal than attempting to sound the profundities of humanity’s 
“immaterial nature.”89 In his understanding, then, doubt pulls the poetic imagination down 
to earth, but it also inspires it to plumb greater depths, and to take as its objects those that 
embody the universal qualities of humanity, rather than that which exceeds humanity. This 
illuminates positive aspects of doubt that stand in contrast to its negative consequences that 
have been enumerated up to this point. Indeed, it seems that for Tocqueville it is precisely 
the irreducibly uncertain or enigmatic character of humanity’s “immaterial nature” that 
makes it fit to be a persistent object of democratic imagination. This is evident in his claim 
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that if human nature were completely obscure or totally clear, it would not be suitable for 
poetry.90 
If we pursue the earlier suggestion that poetry reveals some aspect of a culture’s 
normative dimensionality, then it is readily apparent that this shift in the imagination away 
from the exemplary few and towards the essence of the human being is naturally conducive 
to the notion of universal rights. One modern interpreter of Tocqueville points to this fact 
when he notes that the self—at once universal and unique—takes the place of the noble 
aristocrat as the focal point of poetical imaginings.91 Democratic poetry thus buttresses the 
idea of individual rights by idealizing the abstract and universal individual, who is the 
bearer of those rights. 
Crucially, the “general compassion for all members of the human species” that 
Tocqueville says people in democratic centuries exhibit fortifies democratic poetry in its 
support for universal rights. The reason for this, in his view, is that their sensibility “extends 
to a wider range of objects.” There is no misery that a democratic individual “cannot readily 
conceive,” Tocqueville argues, because his imagination readily puts him in the place of the 
one who is in pain. His pity is “tinged with something personal, causing him to suffer when 
the body of his fellow man is torn to pieces”92 The compassion characteristic of democratic 
peoples, then, is not a conscious inclination toward philanthropy but a heightened capacity 
for empathetic response. 
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Elsewhere, Tocqueville connects the source of this compassion with the 
universalizing tendency also present in the democratic mind, and which seems to provide 
a crucial precondition for the idea of rights. A person in a democratic country, he asserts, 
sees only people more or less like himself, so he cannot think of any part of the human 
species without enlarging and expanding his thought until it encompasses the whole of 
humanity. In the mind of such an individual, “any truth applicable to himself seems 
applicable in the same way to all his fellow citizens.” Tocqueville proceeds to suggest that 
this recognition of similarity opens up the mind to generalizations like natural rights.93 One 
could even posit a connection between these two trends, to the extent that the generalizing 
abstraction and the identifying emotion obey the same impulse. That is to say, through the 
general idea of rights, one identifies each human being with every other human being. 
Similarly, through compassion, one identifies one’s own self with any other human being.94  
In this way, compassion for humanity and the idea of rights reinforce each other. 
While the universalizing tendency of the democratic imagination is conducive to 
the establishment of individual rights as a new source of intellectual authority for moral 
and political discourse, it also bears responsibility for a limitation that the idea of rights 
face in fulfillment of this role. Accounting for this propensity, Tocqueville notes that, if 
one repudiates all received tradition in order to seek one’s way by the light of individual 
reason alone, the resultant opinions will be based on conceptions of human nature, which 
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inevitably yields a large number of general notions.95 A few pages earlier, though, he made 
clear that general ideas attest not to the strength of the human intellect, but to its 
insufficiency, for in nature “no two beings are exactly alike.”96 In a chapter on how 
democracy changes language, he expands on this idea, demonstrating how this tendency 
can produce negative consequences. According to Tocqueville, the passion for general 
ideas manifests itself in language through the constant use of generic terms and abstract 
words. In his view, a principal defect of this is that it can lead to obscurity and vagueness 
of thought and speech. As he puts it, such terms “make the expression more rapid and the 
idea less clear.”97 
Strikingly, Tocqueville goes on to assert that the indeterminate character of these 
generic, abstract words holds particular charm for individuals in democratic countries 
because such people are “almost always wracked by doubt.” As he puts it, they “often have 
vacillating thoughts,” so they “need very broad expressions to contain them.”98 This hints 
at a serious limitation of rights as a new source of intellectual authority and basis for moral 
and political deliberation for democratic people. Rights appear particularly vulnerable to 
being invoked in an imprecise and nebulous way,99 which would limit their utility as 
sources of authority to appeal to in political debate. Individuals might deploy such terms 
as rhetorical weapons while possessing only a minimal consensus on what they meant. A 
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slide towards excessive vagueness in the idea of rights could even have the effect of 
reinforcing the skepticism of normative authority already present among democratic 
people.   
Beyond this limitation of rights, another difficulty with the democratic 
imagination’s zeal for general ideas is that, taken to an extreme, it risks undermining the 
notion of human agency.100 This is hinted at in Tocqueville’s discussion of the tendencies 
of historians in aristocracy and democracy. He observes that in aristocratic times, people 
naturally believed that the activities of the multitude must always be traced back to the 
specific deed on and individual.  By contrast, in democratic times, “when all citizens are 
independent of one another and each of them is weak….individuals seem to have 
absolutely no power over the masses.” Furthermore, society seems to operate own its own 
through the “free and spontaneous cooperation” of all.101 Tocqueville adds that this 
stimulates the mind to search for “the general reason that could have struck so many 
intellects at once and simultaneously reoriented them all.”102 In seeking to resolve this 
problem, one is drawn to the belief that human behavior “is not voluntary and that societies 
are unwittingly obedient to a superior force, which dominates them.”103 The exit of the 
aristocratic lord from the world stage thus lays the groundwork for explaining human action 
in terms of vast, unseen, and impersonal imperatives that seem nearly irresistible.104 
Although not explicitly mentioned here, doubt is nonetheless an implicit theme in this 
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passage, to the extent that the absence of individual influences in democracy and the 
democratic imagination’s propensity to general ideas prompts individuals to doubt whether 
they possess any real control over their destinies. A weakened belief in human agency 
obviously poses a profound threat to the prospect of realizing freedom through self-
government. 
One element of life in a democratic age offers a potential counter to this erosion of 
the belief in individual agency, as well as bulwark against the language of rights slipping 
into indeterminacy. That element is the practice of associating with one’s fellows for a 
common purpose. In Tocqueville’s view, this constitutes the freedom most natural to 
human beings, after the freedom to act alone.105 Furthermore, in his understanding, this 
“most natural freedom” possesses unique importance. He strikingly declares that in 
democratic nations, “associations must take the place of the powerful private individuals 
that equality has eliminated.”106 What exactly Tocqueville means by this, however, 
requires a bit of unpacking.  
It is fitting to begin this task by providing a more complete picture of the role that 
associations fulfill. That, in turn, requires saying a bit about how democracy shapes 
relations among people. According to Tocqueville, democracy disposes each citizen to “cut 
himself off from the mass of his fellow men and withdraw into the circle of family and 
friends,” leaving the larger society to “take care of itself.”107 While aristocracy “linked all 
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citizens together in a long chain,” democracy “breaks the chain and severs the links.”108 In 
this way, it “drives kin closer together while at the same time driving citizens further 
apart.”109 Taken in conjunction with Tocqueville’s preceding remark that democracy 
“relaxes social bonds but tightens natural ones,”110 this suggests that politics and social life 
are not wholly natural, and democracy is in some sense anti-political. Thus, the mechanism 
by which the links of the chain of social life are re-forged must in some way be artificial, 
and contain some aspect of aristocracy.  And in fact, it is in exactly these terms that he 
describes associations, with a particular emphasis on political associations.  
While democracy leads each citizen “back to himself,”111 a political association 
“draws a multitude of individuals out of themselves simultaneously.” Though those 
individuals may differ in any number of ways, “the association brings them 
together…having met once, they can find each other again.”112  As Tocqueville makes 
clear, the value of this contact is potentially enormous. It is via political associations, he 
declares, “that Americans of all walks of life, all casts of mind, and all ages…see and speak 
to one another” and perhaps “come to a common understanding.”113  One scholar elucidates 
the importance of this fact by noting that in political associations, actual people, equal and 
similar but with differences, have to reach an understanding of each other by means of 
exchange and debate rather than through presuming some more basic or abstract sameness 
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of identity or interest. These associations, then, teach citizens how to accept the possibility 
of persuasion.114 Thus, a crucial foundation for self-government is fortified. In fact, 
although the remarks quoted above focus on political associations, Tocqueville gives no 
reason why they would not apply equally to civil associations, which he observes are far 
more numerous in the United States.115 
Indeed, a few pages later, Tocqueville offers further examples of the salutary effects 
of all associations, both civil and political. In the midst of a discussion associations’ 
importance, Tocqueville declares that “feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart expands, 
and the human spirit develops only through the reciprocal action of human beings on one 
another.” He immediately goes on to note, though, that such action “is almost nonexistent 
in democratic countries” and so “must be created artificially.”116  Only associations, he 
says, are up to this task. He underlines this unique competency by averring that a 
government cannot by itself sustain and revitalize the circulation of feelings and ideas in a 
great nation.117  
By arguing that associations sustain, revitalize, and renew the circulation of ideas, 
Tocqueville subtly shows how they possess the potential to keep in check the corrosive 
doubt that democracy engenders. It requires little stretch of the imagination to suppose that 
one of those ideas that associations give life to is that of rights. Furthermore, given that 
associations involve the reciprocal action of specific human beings on one another for 
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particular goals, associations could also provide an element of concreteness to the idea of 
rights, thereby mediating its tendency toward excessive abstraction and vagueness.  It 
follows from this that a robust engagement in associations, both civil and political, serves 
to elevate and sustain rights as a source of normative authority in democratic countries. 
This new “dogmatic belief” restrains the doubt that democracy’s elevation of the individual 
intellect unleashes, and it also imposes a check on the pursuit of material interest. 
Furthermore, by realizing a common goal through the pooling of individual effort, 
associations also counteract the tendency of democratic people to doubt their own agency.  
These, then, are the ways that associations take the place of the powerful private 
individuals that the equality of conditions has eliminated. They re-forge links in the chain 
of society by bringing people into contact with one another. They introduce and sustain 
ideas, most crucially moral and intellectual ideas like universal rights. Finally, by 
combining peoples’ energy to attain ends greater goods than what most isolated individuals 
could achieve, they affirm democratic citizens’ belief in their own capacity to shape their 
destiny. In this manner, associations provide a salutary restraint on doubt and make self-









In Democracy in America, Tocqueville shows that doubt in democracy arises not 
only from the doctrines of Enlightenment philosophers like Descartes, but also from 
distinguishing features of what Tocqueville calls the democratic social state. Specifically, 
democracy’s emphasis on equality in social and political life leads individuals to reject 
received sources of intellectual authority, opting instead to seek on their own and in 
themselves alone the reason for things. However, Tocqueville makes clear that there are 
nonetheless limits on the extent to which this popularized skeptical rationalism can 
generate knowledge. Some of those limits arise from the very same democratic social state 
that generates the doubt. Others, though, arise from certain fixed aspects of human nature. 
The biggest drawback of democratic peoples’ reliance on individual reason as a 
means to knowledge is that most people lack the ability to reach the solid convictions about 
God and human nature that they need to live their lives well. In light of this fact, 
Tocqueville argues that dogmatic beliefs in religion are necessary and desirable. In his 
view, such dogmatic beliefs constitute a modest restraint on intellectual liberty necessary 
to preserve political liberty. 
Left unmediated, though, democratic people’s tendency to skepticism and doubt 
poses serious risks for liberty. First, it leaves no standard for individual conduct besides 
material interest, which attenuates beliefs about other, higher ends. Second, it erodes 
personal convictions, undermining the basis of the public debate necessary for political 
freedom. Third, it weakens belief in individual agency, a notion that self-government 
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cannot function without. Thus, in the absence of some limit to restrain it, democratic doubt 
sets the stage for servitude. 
Nonetheless, other remarks Tocqueville makes in Democracy in America suggest 
that a robust conception of individual rights can provide a new source of intellectual 
authority for political and moral debate that is resistant to doubt’s corrosive power. The 
reasons for the potential solidity of the belief in rights reside in the tendency of the poetic 
imagination in democracy to idealize the abstract individual, who is the bearer of those 
rights, as well as the general compassion that people in democracy exhibit. The practice of 
associations in civil and political life helps prevent the conceptualization of universal rights 
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